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Abstract 
Spouses in transnational Dutch-Moroccan or Dutch-Egyptian marriages potentially 
get married in a foreign legal system or in two legal systems with significant 
differences with regard to, for example, marital property law and the regulation of 
divorce. One of the ways of dealing with the perceived risks and legal uncertainties 
of this situation is to include conditions in the marriage contract or a prenuptial 
agreement. This paper describes the experiences of spouses in Dutch-Moroccan and 
Dutch-Egyptian marriages with agreements upon marriage and after divorce. I will 
address the legal specifics and complications of marriage contracts and prenuptial 
agreements in a transnational context and the meaning of these arrangements for 
the participants in the research, analysing why some couples take a contractual 
view of marriage while others do not.  
Key words 
Migration and Transnational Families; Law in Everyday Life; Marriage Contracts and 
Prenuptial Agreements; Islamic Family Law 
Resumen 
Los cónyuges de matrimonios transnacionales holandeses-marroquíes y 
holandeses-egipcios potencialmente se casan en un sistema jurídico extranjero o en 
dos sistemas legales con diferencias significativas con respecto a, por ejemplo, la 
ley de propiedad conyugal y la regulación del divorcio. Una de las maneras de hacer 
frente a los riesgos percibidos y las incertidumbres jurídicas de esta situación es 
incluir las condiciones en el contrato de matrimonio o en un acuerdo prenupcial. 
Este artículo describe las experiencias de los cónyuges en matrimonios holandeses-
marroquíes y holandeses-egipcios con acuerdos sobre el matrimonio y después del 
divorcio. La autora se refiere a los detalles legales y las complicaciones de los 
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contratos matrimoniales y acuerdos prenupciales en un contexto transnacional y el 
significado de estas disposiciones para los participantes en la investigación, 
analizando por qué algunas parejas tienen una visión contractual del matrimonio, 
mientras que otras no la tienen. 
Palabras clave 
Migración y familias transnacionales; Derecho en la vida cotidiana; contratos 
matrimoniales y acuerdos prematrimoniales; Ley islámica de la familia 
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1. Introduction 
By concluding a marriage contract, prospective spouses can agree on the conditions 
of their married life and plan for eventualities, such as conflicts, death, or divorce. 
For transnational Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Egyptian families, the marriage 
contract also offers an opportunity to choose the legal system applicable to their 
marriage and to create a similar legal position and financial security in both 
countries. As the Netherlands on the one hand and Morocco and Egypt on the other 
hand have quite different laws with regard to maintenance and property during 
marriage and after divorce, the financial consequences of transnational marriage 
and migration can be hard to foresee.  According to Macaulay (1963), in his famous 
article on business relations, a contract involves two elements:  
(a) Rational planning of the transaction with careful provision for as many future 
contingencies as can be foreseen, and (b) the existence or use of actual or potential 
legal sanctions to induce performance of the exchange or to compensate for non-
performance (Macaulay 1963, p. 56). 
In his analysis, Macaulay demonstrated how business relations can differ with 
regard to their “contractualness”, both at the start of the contract and in case of 
disagreements or conflicts. In this article, I will demonstrate how similar differences 
in “contractualness” can be seen in transnational Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-
Egyptian marriages contracts and subsequent divorces. I aim to explain how and 
why spouses in transnational marriages have used contracts at the moment of 
marriage and divorce.  
My analysis is based on 26 interviews with Dutch, Dutch-Moroccan, Egyptian and 
Moroccan men and women divorced from a transnational marriage.1 In this 
research, a transnational marriage is defined as a marriage between spouses who 
have grown up in two different countries. This research group thus encompasses 
both mixed marriages between native Dutch and Moroccan or Egyptian spouses as 
well as so-called migration marriages. In this last category, a Dutch partner of 
Moroccan descent marries a partner from their parents’ country of origin.2 A 
secondary source of information in this research are the results of 35 interviews 
with other persons and organizations involved in transnational marriages and 
divorces, including lawyers and other legal professionals, NGOs, embassy staff, and 
translators.  
While most interviewees in the research project had included some sort of 
conditions in their marriage contract, mostly concerning a sum of money to be paid 
by the husband to the wife, a mahr, only a minority carefully planned for eventual 
contingencies and used the possibilities to deviate from the standard legal 
consequences of marriage. Moreover, how and why those who included such 
conditions wrote their contracts differed. This article analyses how transnational 
couples make use of legal possibilities, which are also legal processes, at two 
important moments in their lives: marriage and divorce. I will argue that the use of 
contracts can be explained by spouses’ perceptions of the risks their marriage 
entailed. This risk perception should be understood in the social context of the 
                                                 
1 The semi-structured interviews took place between 2009-2012 in Egypt, Morocco, and the Netherlands. 
The interviews lasted between one and four hours and were conducted in the best communal language 
of interviewee and interviewer (mostly Dutch, but also French, English, and Arabic). These interviews 
were part of a research project on transnational divorce in Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Egyptian families. 
This research project is part of a larger programme on family law and transnational families at the 
Radboud University in Nijmegen, coordinated by prof. dr. B. de Hart and funded by the Netherlands 
Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).  
2 In the Netherlands these people are generally seen as second generation migrants or second 
generation allochtonen, consisting mostly of the children of the Moroccan and Turkish labour migrants 
who came to work in the Netherlands in the 1960s-1980s. Their marriages to spouses from their 
parents’ country of origin (often called “import brides”) are regularly presented as a problem, hindering 
integration in Dutch society. Several measures in immigration law have been taken in an attempt to limit 
marriage migration (Bonjour 2006, 2009). 
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marriage, including debates on transnational marriages and images and perceptions 
of Dutch, Egyptian, Moroccan family law.  
Below, I will start with an introduction of the three legal systems and the 
possibilities for conditions upon marriage, introducing four types of marriage 
agreements; followed by a short theoretical framework of risk perception and 
transnational marriage contracts. Next, I will demonstrate the diversity in handling 
these possibilities by presenting three stories of spouses about concluding and 
ending a transnational marriage. Then I connect these three stories, each 
conducted at a different time and place, to the social contexts in which they took 
place, demonstrating the interconnectedness between individual experiences and 
choices and the social context in which transnational marriages take place.  
2. Conditions upon marriage – possibilities in Egypt, Morocco, and the 
Netherlands 
In Egyptian and Moroccan family law, which are both based on Islamic family law, it 
is possible to include different kinds of stipulations in the marriage contract itself or 
in an appendix.3 In the Netherlands, marriage is less visibly a contract. Although 
couples receive a “trouwboekje” or marriage booklet as a proof of their marriage, 
they do not have a copy of an actual marriage contract, like in Morocco or Egypt. 
Instead, it is possible to sign a prenuptial contract before the marriage, which 
details the division of property and financial resources during and after the 
marriage, called huwelijkse voorwaarden. Such a contract needs to be made and 
signed before the marriage by a notary, and it can be quite expensive in more 
complicated cases.4  
Four types of agreements can be made by transnational Dutch-Moroccan and 
Dutch-Egyptian couples at the moment of their marriage. First of all, interpersonal 
stipulations in the marriage contract can permit or prohibit certain behaviour of the 
spouses during the marriage. The marriage can be dissolved if these conditions are 
not met. Such conditions are legally possible in Egypt or Morocco but not in the 
Netherlands. Although both men and women can include such conditions in the 
marriage contract, most of these are included for the benefit of the wife.5 A couple 
can choose, for example, to include stipulations that enable the wife to work, 
travel, or finish her education.6 Another possible provision called isma (Egypt) or 
tamlik (Morocco) gives the wife equal rights to divorce, without having to go to 
court (Welchmann 2004, p. 71; Singerman 2005, p. 173; Jordens-Cotran 2007, p. 
142- 152).7 However, including such interpersonal conditions in marriage contracts 
                                                 
3 Although both the Moroccan Moudawana and the Egyptian Personal Status Laws are based on aspects 
of Islamic Family law, which is in itself a contested concept (see for example: Dupret 2007), there are 
significant differences between the Egyptian and Moroccan legal systems and I will generally discuss 
them separately.  
4 Based on a short comparison of websites of notaries, I estimate that the costs range from around 
€400-500 for the cheapest option up to €1000-1500 in more complicated (transnational) cases. It is also 
possible to conclude such a contract later, during the marriage, but that requires a more complicated 
and costly court procedure (Mourik and Nuytinck 2006: p. 112-117). 
5 This is, of course, also related to the fact that the husband already has easy access to divorce, and 
thus he has little use for including stipulations which would enable him to divorce more easily if one of 
the conditions is not met. 
6 These last stipulations are controversial among Egyptian women’s groups and activists because they 
believe women already have these rights in Egyptian law (Singerman 2005: p. 173; Welchmann 2004: 
p. 71). 
7 According to Welchman, “The basic principle is that the stipulations may not make what is prohibited 
lawful nor what is lawful prohibited” (Welchmann 2004: p. 71). Permissible stipulations are for example 
that the couple will not move abroad or live with in-laws or that the wife can keep running her own 
business. However, the wife cannot stipulate that her husband will not divorce her, and the husband 
cannot demand that his wife will not have children or limit his obligation to maintain his family (Jordens-
Cotran 2007: p. 142- 152; Welchmann 2004: p. 71).   
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is controversial in both Egypt and Morocco and is only used by a small minority 
(Singerman 2005, p. 173).8 
A second type of agreement is concerned with the division of property. This can be 
relevant during the marriage but, in practice, even more so at the moment of 
divorce, when all property needs to be divided between two households.  In the 
Netherlands, at the moment of marriage, all property and debts of both spouses 
becomes communal property. As such, the married couple becomes an economic 
unit, in which both partners share profit and loss, regardless of who performs 
economic or household tasks.  According to Dutch private international law, Dutch 
property law is also applicable if a transnational couple has their first communal 
residence after marriage in the Netherlands, even if they married abroad. In 2009, 
in about one out of four marriages a prenuptial arrangement was made to deviate 
from this default-situation of communal property.9 Several kinds of prenuptial 
agreements are possible. In 2009 almost 30% of agreements were based on the 
principle of koude uitsluiting, (“cold exclusion”), meaning that the property of both 
spouses remains completely separated.10 All other agreements have some kind of 
mix between community and private property, for example that the property 
remains separated but that the spouses equally share their income (Schols and 
Hoens 2012). In Morocco and Egypt, on the other hand, a complete separation of 
the property of both spouses is the standard. In Egypt, couples cannot opt for any 
other division in their marriage contract. However, it is possible to include a list of 
property belonging to the wife, called an ayma  (see Sonneveld 2009, p. 116-118). 
In Morocco, since 2004, the spouses can agree on a different division and use of 
property accumulated during the marriage. Just like the marriage contract, this 
agreement needs to be written by a notary, but in a document separate from the 
marriage contract.11 
A third, also financial, form of agreement in marriage contracts is the mahr or 
sadaq (dower), an amount of money paid by the husband to the wife, which 
remains her personal property. In both Egypt and Morocco, the inclusion of a mahr 
in the marriage contract is a necessary requirement to make the contract valid, and 
thus it is not optional as is the case with the agreements discussed earlier. 
However, the amount of mahr paid is not prescribed, making it possible to write 
down only a symbolic amount. The mahr can consist of two parts, one part is paid 
at the moment of concluding the marriage, while the other part remains a debt to 
be paid by the husband in case the marriage ends (Jordens-Cotran 2007, p. 126-
135).  
The last form of agreement is the choice of law applicable to the marriage. In the 
Netherlands, couples can agree in their huwelijkse voorwaarden on which national 
law will be applicable to their marriage and in case of divorce. This is especially 
relevant for Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Egyptian couples because of the large 
differences between Dutch and Egyptian or Moroccan legal principles on the division 
of property during the marriage and other financial issues such as maintenance. 
However, in Morocco or Egypt such a choice of applicable legal system in the 
marriage contract is not valid. Moroccan or Egyptian family law is always applied to 
marriages in which a Moroccan or an Egyptian spouse is involved. After this 
introduction of the four categories of marital agreements possible in transnational 
                                                 
8 In research done in the early 1990s in Rabat, only 36 out of 1,503 marriage contracts were found to 
include stipulations, mostly a stipulation that the wife had the right to work outside of the house 
(Bouman 1992). 
9 As arranged in BW.01.93-113. These percentages include civil partnerships (geregistreerd 
partnerschap), which is equal to marriage with regard to property law. 
10 This seems to be a recent trend. Until 2003, the percentage was going down, with a low point of only 
11%, while in the past, the number of cold exclusion arrangements was far larger, around 70% in 1970. 
After 2003, the number of cold exclusions went up again sharply. The researchers note that part of the 
difference may be related to a broadening of the definition of cold exclusion (Schols and Hoens 2012) 
(see also: Mourik and Burgerhart 2005; Mourik and Nuytinck 2006). 
11 Art. 49 Moudawana 2004. 
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marriages, I will now present a short theoretical framework on risk perception and 
marriage contracts.   
3. Risk perception and transnational marriage contracts 
Mahar (2003) and Baker & Emery (1993) have tried to explain a relative lack of 
prenuptial agreements by studying risk perceptions focusing on the risk of divorce. 
Baker and Emery found that respondents, despite a fairly accurate perception of the 
divorce risk, and the consequences of divorce in general, still displayed “unrealistic 
optimism” about the chances of their own marriage ending in divorce or of the 
consequences of divorce in their own case (Baker and Emery 1993). Mahar also 
found an “optimism bias”, a belief that the marriage will last, and a fear of signaling 
uncertainty about the marriage when insisting on a prenuptial agreement (Mahar 
2003).  
While the perceived risk of divorce may play a role in taking a more contractual 
view of marriage, taking precautions for eventualities by writing a contract, this 
does not adequately explain the content of the contract. As has been demonstrated 
above, spouses in transnational marriages can conclude several kinds of contracts, 
including a wide range of possible arrangements. As the cases below will illustrate, 
marital contracts in transnational marriages did not just include provisions for the 
eventuality of divorce, but they also involved agreements relevant during the 
marriage. By focusing just on the risk of divorce and the presence of a prenuptial 
contract, the widely different contents of these contracts are easily overlooked.  
In this article, I argue that it is the context of the marriage which is of crucial 
importance to understand how and why spouses in transnational families have 
made use of the possibilities to include conditions in their marriage contract. 
Studies dealing with public risk perceptions of environmental hazards and new 
technologies have demonstrated how the social, cultural, and historical context is 
important for risk perception (Jasanoff 1998). Kasperson et al. (1988) have 
developed a conceptual framework, “the social amplification of risk”, describing how 
risks can be socially amplified as well as attenuated. Powerful means of 
amplification are the use of symbols and the communication of risk messages 
through media and informal networks (Kasperson et al. 1988). Framing is an 
important part of this process. According to Jasanoff: 
[a risk discourse] frames the world, so that users of the discourse are 
systematically alerted to certain features but desensitized to others. Such frames in 
turn delimit the universe of possible scientific inquiry, political debate, and policy 
options; yet they remain in many ways invisible to people operating within the 
frame. (Jasanoff 1998, p. 96) 
Below, I will argue that the particular frames available for the risks of transnational 
marriages depend on the context of the marriage and divorce. As to place, these 
contexts can be divided into three distinct elements: time, place, and distance. The 
marriages and divorces in this study took place in three countries and in different 
regions within those countries. These places are distinguished by significant 
differences with regard to discourses on mixed or migration marriages and 
perceptions of the Other, but they are also distinguished by the practical 
opportunities and legal information available for transnational couples. Practical 
opportunities also change over time, connected to the history of Moroccan and 
Egyptian migration to the Netherlands and legal measures taken to limit marriage 
migration. Discourses on mixed and migration marriages also shift over time, as do 
legal rules and regulations. Partly as a result of place and time, the physical, social, 
and cultural distance between the spouses in transnational marriages can vary, 
forming the third context in which spouses in transnational marriages handle law 
during marriage and divorce. This perception of distance is an important aspect of 
risk perception in transnational marriages and informs the distinction between the 
two main groups in this research project: mixed and migration marriages.  
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According to Waldis, all marriages contain aspects of sameness and difference, and 
it is only those differences that are marked as significant which make a marriage 
mixed (Waldis 2006, p. 3). The main marker of difference between the two 
categories of marriages in this study is ethnicity, which also includes elements of 
religion and culture. While marriages between native Dutch spouses and Moroccan 
or Egyptian spouses are being seen as mixed, in so-called “migration marriages”, 
spouses marry someone from the same ethnic group, sometimes even the same 
extended family or village, but from another country. These last marriages are 
transnational but, from the perspectives of the spouses and of Dutch society, they 
are not “mixed”. The perceived cultural distance between the spouses is especially 
large in Dutch-Egyptian and Dutch-Moroccan mixed marriages, where images of 
Orientalism and Occidentalism polarize “Western” and “Islamic” societies and 
culture. As will be demonstrated below, distance is an important factor in how 
spouses in transnational marriages deal with their marriage contract; mixed 
marriages in this study were generally more contractual than migration marriages.  
4. Dealing with insecurity and risk – contracting a transnational marriage  
Most interviewees did not have a very contractual approach at the moment of 
marriage.  However, there were some important differences between the different 
groups represented in this research. Whereas the mahr was important in mostly 
Dutch-Moroccan migration marriages, interpersonal conditions were more of an 
issue in mixed marriages. Aiming to show the diversity of arguments for the 
different kinds of conditions and the contexts and circumstances in which these are 
made, I have chosen to focus on three stories of spouses who expressed something 
about their choice in the interview. All of the three stories I present here are told by 
women, two of them native Dutch women living in the Netherlands and a third a 
Moroccan woman that moved to the Netherlands after her marriage to a Dutch-
Moroccan man. Although it was not a deliberate choice to focus on women’s stories, 
the subject of marital conditions was mostly discussed by female respondents. This 
is not surprising considering that most stipulations are considered to be there for 
the benefit of the wife, especially in Egyptian or Moroccan marriage contracts. 
Female respondents are also overrepresented in my research project.12  
Below I will introduce the stories of Eva, a Dutch woman who married her Moroccan 
husband Ayman in the Netherlands in the 1970s; Inge, a Dutch woman who 
married her Moroccan husband Hicham in Morocco in the 2000s; and Rabia, a 
Moroccan woman who married her Dutch-Moroccan husband Mo in Morocco, in the 
1970s.13 I will present these narratives from the perspectives of the interviewees.14 
Next, I will further analyze and compare these three stories and connect them to 
ongoing debates in Dutch society with regard to Islamic family law, migration 
marriages, and mixed marriages.  
4.1. Eva – A mixed marriage from the 1970s 
Eva met her husband Ayman in the Netherlands, where they were both doing 
voluntary work in the early 1970s. She was studying at that time, while he had 
broken off his studies in Morocco to find work in the Netherlands. They fell in love 
and started living together, but they took a long time to decide whether they would 
marry: 
We did not reach a decision about getting married just like that. We were very 
much in love with each other, but we also saw many problems surrounding mixed 
                                                 
12 Out of 26 interviews with divorced spouses only 5 respondents were male. Although I have tried at 
length to include more stories of men in my research, I had serious difficulties in finding men who had 
been in a transnational marriage and were willing to participate in the research project. 
13 All names and some details of the stories have been left out or modified to prevent recognition.   
14 As I have only interviewed one of the spouses, these are one-sided stories by default. Had I 
interviewed their former husbands instead, I would probably have collected a different, though equally 
interesting, set of narratives. 
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marriages. […] Well, there were moments we thought that we should not do it 
[getting married], it is not wise, considering everything we saw happening with 
acquaintances, but we were also so attached to each other that we thought we 
should just try.15  
Eva and Ayman knew many mixed couples, both personally as well as 
professionally. Based on those experiences, they perceived the risk of divorce as 
serious. When they eventually got married, they prepared the legal aspects well. 
They used their Dutch and Moroccan networks to gain information about the legal 
aspects of transnational marriages, both in the Netherlands and in Morocco. 
Although they married and made their prenuptial agreement in the Netherlands, 
they chose French as a language and chose for Moroccan law to be applicable to 
their marriage. Their main aim was to make a contract “which would not be open to 
misinterpretation in either country”. Because of earlier experiences with Dutch law 
Eva distrusted the way the Dutch legal system handled mixed marriages: 
[…] I noticed from all the mixed marriages I knew that Dutch law handles them 
rather oddly. We were asked at the town hall [at the moment of marriage] if we 
were going to raise our children in Islam. I said: “that’s none of your business”. 
[Town Hall administrator:] “Well, I need to know whether there will be a second 
nationality”. […] But we wanted our children to choose their own nationality once 
they became 18 years old. […] The fact that Dutch women could not pass on their 
nationality to their children at that time deeply offended me, how old-fashioned our 
Dutch law is!16   
By including all the Moroccan requirements for a valid marriage, Eva and Ayman 
aimed for a prenuptial agreement which would be clear for both legal systems, 
avoiding problems of interpretation later on. This decision was partly informed by 
the experiences of other mixed couples in their environment, which negatively 
influenced their perception of Dutch law and mixed marriages. Interestingly, while 
Eva felt offended by the gender inequalities in Dutch nationality law at the time, 
she did not mention similar gender inequalities in Moroccan nationality or family law 
as being objectionable; her experiences and worries all concerned Dutch law.  
I: Did you have the contract acknowledged or registered at the consulate? 
Eva: No. We made a French contract onder huwelijkse voorwaarden, in which it was 
clear that my father was the wali [marriage guardian] and I would have a dowry, 
yes, that looked like the phrases in Moroccan style.17 But we particularly married 
for the Dutch law. […] In the end we did not need it [the contract], because we 
divorced in the Netherlands. But even then we thought, there is a difference in law 
between Morocco and the Netherlands, and we did not want to agree on something 
here that would be interpreted differently there. And the other way around as well. 
We did not want to agree on something that would be interpreted negatively in the 
Netherlands. So we did what was possible, necessary, to make something valid in 
Moroccan law at that time, and we took that into account in this French-language 
contract. With separated property, my father was wali. It just missed mentioning I 
was not a virgin, you know, those kind of things. But it did mention that I had I 
right to travel to my parents, travel to Europe, a right to work. You can see that 
there, each spouse had their own private property, while we in the Netherlands 
pretend you always automatically have to share everything.  
Eva describes her marriage as “particularly” for Dutch law. She and Ayman choose 
to marry in the Netherlands, but they based their prenuptial agreement on 
Moroccan family law, in an attempt to reconcile both legal systems. Interestingly, 
however, the marriage was never actually registered with the Moroccan authorities. 
This is remarkable considering Eva’s and Ayman’s intent to conclude a marriage 
                                                 
15 All three interviews were conducted in Dutch. Interview fragments have been translated by the 
author. I have tried to keep as close to the original text as possible, but some editing has occurred to 
improve clarity for the reader.  
16 At the moment of Eva’s marriage, Dutch women were not able to pass on their nationality to their 
children. This was changed in 1985. Morocco made similar reforms in 2007.  
17 A wali, or marriage guardian, used to be obligatory when concluding a Moroccan marriage. 
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contract which was equally valid in both countries. Furthermore, Eva also shows a 
preference for some aspects of Moroccan family law over those of Dutch law, such 
as the separation of marital property. However, she also slightly ridicules the 
contract by joking about virginity.  
Eva and Ayman also included a mahr in their Dutch prenuptial agreement:  
I: In the beginning [of the interview] you mentioned having made arrangements for 
a dowry? 
Eva: yes. 
I: Was it registered and paid right away; how did you arrange that?  
Eva: In the [marriage] contract it should be, at least according to the Moroccan 
norms of that time, mentioned whether a dowry is involved. Ayman had bought an 
encyclopedia from a colleague. It had cost him an arm and a leg and he was very 
fond of it. […]  He was the one who bought it from a colleague, it was his. But he 
thought it would be a good, symbolic dowry for me. Because it then would not be 
about the money, but just about, well, a symbolic value, highlighting my scientific 
side.  
In an attempt to reconcile Dutch and Moroccan norms on mahr, Ayman creatively 
chose a present for his Dutch wife-to-be that pleased her and would be acceptable 
legally as well as socially in both countries.  
The marital agreement did not just have a legal significance for Eva. On a more 
personal level, Eva also sees this contract, including many interpersonal 
stipulations, as a reflection of an agreement about their marital relationship. 
It shows that we … just wanted to be together, realizing that you are living in a 
society which attaches expectations to that, and those can differ between Morocco 
and the Netherlands. I mean, this is of course the legal consequence of the fact 
that we conferred a lot, also in other areas.  
Eva wanted to take precautions for the risk of mismatched expectations based on 
societal differences between the Netherlands and Morocco. She described the 
careful discussions on the stipulations in the agreement as symbolic of their 
marriage.  
After five years of marriage, Eva and Ayman were doubting whether their 
relationship could bear raising children. They decided it would not be wise to start a 
family together and they filed for divorce. Again, this divorce was very much a 
united affair, carefully considered and discussed. For example, even though they 
had chosen for separated property at the moment of marriage, they equally split 
their belongings at the moment of divorce, based on personal need: 
R: We divided the property. It was clear he needed this, I needed that. […] We 
could quite easily separate the things. We had agreed together like, you will get 
this many chairs, I will get that many, I’ll get this many tables, you’ll get that 
many, I’ll take the Friese clock, you’ll get the little bible… The photos we divided 
equally, agreeing that we could always get copies of each other’s photos. 
To Eva’s surprise, after their divorce, Ayman insisted that she kept the 
encyclopedia: 
And well, it was in the contract, so when we separated I suddenly got the 
encyclopedia. And I thought he could use it far better than I could, but no, he 
insisted; “this is yours”. And it was a nice thing to have, of course.  
As it was Eva’s mahr, the encyclopedia already became legally hers at the moment 
of marriage. However, as Eva and Ayman took needs instead of rights as the main 
principle when dividing their marital property, Eva felt that Ayman should have kept 
the encyclopedia.  
Thus, while Eva and Ayman’s marriage was very contractual and friendly while 
carefully planning for eventualities and possible risks, their divorce was far less 
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contractual. Even though they had intended to reconcile Dutch and Moroccan family 
law in their marriage, they never had any actual contact with Moroccan family law. 
In the end they split property based on need and fairness, in a very non-contractual 
way. Their carefully drafted prenuptial agreement was never actually put into 
action, except for the mahr.  
4.2. Inge  
Inge met Hicham on a holiday in Morocco, in 2005. It was love at first sight, and at 
the end of the holiday Hicham started to discuss marriage. Inge was happy to 
accept the idea: 
For me, it really felt right. I did not have the impression that he had other 
intentions. It was just, well, love at first sight. It felt right. But then I had to return 
home, because of my plane ticket. And I said: I’ll try to come again very soon.  
A few months later Inge returned to Morocco and started to arrange the marriage. 
She collected information from the Dutch embassy in Rabat and spent time at 
several Dutch institutions to collect all the paperwork for the marriage, which took 
place in Morocco a few months later. They celebrated a small ceremony in the 
presence of Hicham’s family. As a mahr, Hicham gave Inge a golden coin, a 
traditional gift according to Inge. While preparing for the marriage, Inge also tried 
to gain more in-depth knowledge of Moroccan family law. She bought a Dutch 
translation of the Moroccan family law Moudawana, and she searched the internet 
for information. Based on this information she took special care writing the 
marriage contract: 
I: Did you have any special conditions in the contract? 
R: Yes. I included certain conditions with regard to divorce, second wife. Let’s see, 
to be free to work, free to travel, and I included a stipulation that, in case I die, 
part of my money would be for my children. I have got two sons in the 
Netherlands. Otherwise, everything would go to my husband’s family, because it is 
an Islamic marriage. So I sorted out everything well beforehand, gained more in-
depth knowledge of the law. I indeed bought a readable book in the Netherlands to 
see what all the rules are like, for men and women. There have been reforms that 
women get more rights if they marry.  
In planning for the risks of her marriage, such as death, Inge focussed her 
orientation on Moroccan family law. The text on inheritance in Moroccan family law 
is a long and complicated enumeration of all kinds of family members, from which 
Inge easily could have gotten the impression that her husband’s family would 
inherit everything. However, from a legal perspective, the stipulation about 
inheritance does not make sense in Morocco. As Inge was a Christian, Hicham, a 
Muslim, could not inherit anything from her.18 And even if they had been of the 
same religion, he would only have inherited a small part of her property, the rest 
would have been inherited by her children and her other family members. In either 
case, the family-in-law would not inherit. Moreover, as they were planning to live in 
the Netherlands, and as Inge’s property was located there, Dutch inheritance law 
would have been applicable. In the Netherlands, Hicham would inherit all property 
upon her death. Her children could claim their shares only after his death, if any of 
the property was left by then.19 Thus, to make sure her children would inherit, Inge 
should not have included stipulations in her Moroccan marriage contract, but she 
should have made a Dutch will. 
After the marriage took place in Morocco, Inge registered the marriage in the 
Netherlands and started the necessary migration procedures to have her new 
husband come to the Netherlands, where she had her business. During the 
immigration process, Inge began to have some doubts about her marriage. After 
                                                 
18 Art. 332 Moudawana 2004. 
19 Art. 4:13 BW. 
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discussing moving to Morocco and starting a new business, Hicham asked her to 
buy a house for them in Morocco: 
But then he came with two apartments. He said: we could let out one and live in 
the other. […] They were very nice houses by the way, but I got the impression 
that he was figuring out how much money we could dispose of. And that did not 
feel good to me.  
Apparently, Inge had not shared information about her financial situation with her 
husband, keeping their finances entirely separated. In the context of a substantial 
difference in wealth between Inge and Hisham, Inge was suspicious of Hisham’s 
intentions when he wanted her to buy a house. After this first incident, a second 
incident happened, which strengthened her doubts about the marriage: 
Then he had bought something and asked me for money. And from that moment I 
had the idea that this did not feel right to me. […] In the [sic] Islam, it is absolutely 
not permitted that a husband asks his wife for money, right, to make a certain 
purchase for him. So that did not feel right to me. I gave him the money, it was 
300 euro, so it did not run into thousands right away. It was very strange for me. I 
asked him: is something wrong? You never asked me for money. You have always 
provided for yourself. We are trying to build something together, and this is very 
unfortunate. It just did not feel right to me.  
Inge felt Hicham’s request for money was improper. Even though they were 
married, she still expected ongoing financial independence from Hicham. She refers 
to an “Islamic” notion of men not being allowed to ask their wives for money, 
possibly based on the concept that in Moroccan family law husbands are 
responsible for maintaining their wives and children, keeping the wife’s property 
separate.20 Interestingly, once Hicham would have migrated to the Netherlands, 
Dutch law would have become applicable to their marriage, meaning that they 
would have been married under communal property, as they had made no 
prenuptial agreement in the Netherlands. Furthermore, Inge would have been 
responsible for Hicham’s upkeep. After this incident, Inge stayed away from 
Morocco for a few months before visiting Hicham again. In the meantime, she got 
the news that her application for a Dutch residence permit for Hicham had been 
rejected. According to Inge, this news was a real turning point in their relationship. 
And from the moment I told him that the visa was called off he withdrew himself 
enormously. Then I tried again at the IND [Dutch immigration service], which also 
cost a lot of money to get started. I registered the marriage [in the Netherlands]. I 
really meant to make it a successful marriage. But it must be a two-sided affair.  
As Inge had already invested a lot in this marriage, both emotionally as well as 
financially, she decided to spend the summer in Morocco, with her children, and 
give her marriage a last chance. During their holiday together, Hicham withdrew 
into himself a lot. Inge decided that she wanted a divorce. Together with the 
demand for money, Inge seems to consider this to be a sign that, for Hicham, this 
was not a “real” marriage, referring to an ideal of marriages based only on love, to 
the exclusion of other motives. 
Inge did not tell Hicham about her divorce plans right away. Before leaving for 
Morocco she had discussed her marital problems with a Moroccan friend. She had 
warned her about the consequences of leaving Hicham: 
My friend warned me: be careful if you want to finish [the marriage]. Because, if 
you tell him you want to finish when you are there, he can make sure you are 
arrested at the border and put into prison. So I did not say anything and went 
home.  
                                                 
20 However, Article 199 of the Moudawana of 2004 reads: “In the event the father becomes wholly or 
partly unable to pay maintenance to his children, and the mother is affluent, the latter shall become 
responsible for their maintenance in proportion to the amount the father is unable to pay” (Translation: 
HREA 2004).  
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In Moroccan law, Hicham had no rights to have his wife arrested for leaving him. He 
could also not stop her from travelling abroad.21 Still, Inge felt this warning 
presented a real danger, and she only told him she was going to leave him after 
she had safely returned to the Netherlands.  
After her return to the Netherlands she contacted a lawyer specializing in Dutch-
Moroccan divorce cases who arranged a Dutch divorce for her. As they had never 
lived together in the Netherlands, their property had remained separate, and no 
maintenance had to be paid. For Inge this was self-evident; she never considered 
that things might have been different had they already been living together in the 
Netherlands. After migration, Dutch law would have been applied to their marriage 
and she would have had to pay maintenance to Hicham for some time and share 
half of her property, including her business, with him: 
I had no obligations towards him, because, in that sense, he never had anything of 
me, nor I anything of him. We did not own a house in Morocco. In fact, apart from 
losing my money, I escaped unscathed. 
In the end, their marriage had lasted a year and a half. At the moment of the 
interview, several years later, Inge now doubts Hisham’s intentions when getting 
married. She feels he changed completely after they got married and especially 
after the application for the Dutch residence permit failed. Looking back on her 
marriage, she now fears it was “all about the residence permit” after all. The fact 
that he asked her for money was, according to Inge, a strong sign that it was not a 
“real marriage” for him. Inge still fears that she will be arrested and put in prison if 
she visits Morocco, as she is divorced in the Netherlands but not in Morocco. She 
has made digital copies of all the divorce papers and emailed them to Hicham, but 
she does not know whether he actually arranged for the recognition of the divorce 
in Morocco. She now believes she will never again be able to visit Morocco safely.  
Thus, even though Inge had a very contractual approach to her marriage, the 
marriage contract was of little use when arranging the divorce. The precautions she 
took all concerned possible conflicts or problems during the marriage or the 
eventuality of death, not divorce. 
4.3. Rabia  
Rabia was studying when she met her Dutch-Moroccan husband Mo, in the 1970s in 
Morocco. Mo was visiting mutual friends for a summer holiday. Rabia liked him a 
lot, as he was such a nice and funny man, and at the end of the summer they 
decided to get married. Mo went back to the Netherlands and would come back to 
Morocco for the marriage. Even though Rabia’s family objected to Mo, as he wanted 
to marry without having money, Rabia and Mo married later that year. In their 
marriage contract they agreed on a mahr of 500 gulden.22 Mo would buy furniture 
from the money, which would then be Rabia’s property.  
At that time, Mo was aiming to start a new business in Morocco. After their 
marriage, he went back to the Netherlands to prepare the business, while Rabia 
stayed in Morocco to finish her studies. Their first child was also born in Morocco: 
I had my job, and he would run the project. But in the end he did not have money 
to run the project. He was just having fun. He did not have a foundation to build 
on.  
Mo’s failure to keep his promises was a recurring theme in Rabia’s story. After it 
was clear that the project to return to Morocco had failed, Rabia decided to move to 
                                                 
21 In the old Moroccan Moudawana (1957/1958) a legal obligation of obedience of the wife to the 
husband existed, which entailed living in the marital home. Contrary to what many people think, this 
does not give the husband the right to have his wife arrested and brought back to him. Legally, the only 
possible penalty for the wife consists of suspending her rights to maintenance, and this can happen only 
after she ignores a court order to return to the marital home (Art. 123 old Moudawana).  
22 Dutch currency at the time. 500 gulden is approximately 225 euro. 
Iris Sportel  “Because It's an Islamic Marriage” Conditions Upon… 
the Netherlands with their child, as she did not believe in long-distance marriages. 
Her arrival in the Netherlands was a big disappointment for her: 
When I arrived, I was surprised. Because I thought he had a job. Well, I was quite 
naïve, despite my education. […]  In Morocco, someone working abroad sounded 
like a lot. But that was not the way it was.  
In the Moroccan context, in which men working abroad are considered to earn a lot 
of money, Rabia trusted Mo’s promises and did not consider the marriage a 
financial risk. Thus, Rabia was taken aback when the furniture which had been 
promised in her marriage contract turned out not to be there. Mo did not even own 
a bed. A few months later the couple was so poor they lacked the money to buy 
food for their child. Rabia started to learn Dutch, and after their second child was 
born, she started to look for a job. After she found good employment, Mo worked 
for a few more months, and then he quit his job. While Rabia was working fulltime 
and taking care of a growing number of children, he spent his time sleeping, 
drinking coffee, and gambling. Mo turned out to be a very controlling husband, and 
Rabia led an isolated life. Through her work, she quickly learnt to speak Dutch 
fluently, and her language skills eventually surpassed those of Mo, even though he 
had lived most of his life in the Netherlands.  
After several years of marriage, Mo wanted to start a new business abroad. Rabia 
took out a loan in her own name to finance the start of Mo’s new business, and she 
continued to live and working in the Netherlands with the children while Mo moved 
abroad to start his business. They had some arguments and she grew suspicious. 
She took the children with her and went to see Mo. She discovered that Mo was 
having an affair with one of the employees of the new business. Devastated with 
grief, she returned to the Netherlands. Back home, she was confronted with a 
financial chaos. Mo had always been handling the accounts, and it turned out the 
family was in severe debt. Mo had neglected to pay the mortgage on the family 
home for some time, and Rabia was at the point of losing the house. Rabia went to 
work immediately, and step by step she managed to pay off all the debts over a 
period of six years. Meanwhile, Mo refused to have any contact with her or the 
children: 
That man had only greed for money. No love or something. Then I had patience, 
hoping he would miss the children, that he would visit. But that was not the case. 
He did not call, he did not visit. So he left everything behind and forgot. That’s why 
I went on with my job, with the life I tried to build.  
Rabia kept hoping that Mo would come back to her and the children for a while, but 
after a year she decided to apply for a divorce in the Netherlands. Mo did not 
respond to the procedure. Rabia was not completely happy with the results of the 
Dutch divorce procedure. 
R: Afterwards I discovered the verdict was not clear to me, that I did not agree on 
several points. Still.  
I: What kind of things? 
R: The amount of maintenance. The house I paid for myself. They said that, if I 
sold it, I need to repay him part of the money. While the value increased every 
year. From the beginning I was the only one working, the only one paying. He is 
out of the picture and does nothing. But still a part of the sum has to go to him.  
I: Even now, if you would sell it? 
R: Yes 
I: And will you do that, if you ever sell? 
R: I don’t know. [laughs] I don’t know.  
As Rabia and Mo first started living together in the Netherlands, and they did not 
make a Dutch prenuptial arrangement, Dutch family law was applicable to the 
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division of property. This meant that all debts and property would have to be 
divided. As Mo was abroad, Rabia paid off all the debts herself and never received 
any maintenance. However, from her conversations with her lawyer and the court 
documents, Rabia got the impression that, if she ever sold the house, she would 
still be obliged to share part the profit with Mo, something which she resisted, as 
she had been paying for the house on her own. After the Dutch divorce, Rabia did 
not register it in Morocco, even though Moroccan courts could have been used to 
force Mo to pay maintenance for his children. Rabia could not spare the time or 
money needed to travel to Morocco to arrange for a divorce procedure.23  
Rabia and Mo did not have a very contractual approach to their marriage, and Rabia 
saw little financial risk in marrying a husband living in the Netherlands. As Mo was 
absent and debts were a problem, Rabia was forced to take a legal, contractual, 
approach to their divorce, letting the court decide on financial arrangements and 
the division of property. However, these decisions did not fit her sense of a fair 
arrangement, and she considered just to avoid paying the amount she thought Mo 
was entitled to after she sold the house.   
5. Framing risk in transnational marriage 
These three stories about contracting and dissolving a transnational marriage can 
be better understood when looking at the contexts in which the marriages were 
concluded. In a context of differences between the Netherlands and Morocco, Rabia 
did not see her marriage to a man working in the wealthy Netherlands as a great 
financial risk. The differences between the stories of Eva, who married in the 
1970s, and Inge, who married in 2005, both of whom took a very contractual 
approach to the marriage, could be partly explained as a result of a shift in public 
discourse from a focus on mixed marriages as a problem later to a focus on Muslim 
men as a problem. Whereas Eva worried, together with her husband, about the 
stability of mixed marriages and tried to protect herself against the possible 
interactions of the legal systems, Inge worried about concluding an “Islamic 
marriage” and tried to protect herself against the perceived privileges of men in 
Moroccan family law. In this section, I will go further into the social developments 
and Dutch debates regarding mixed and migration marriages that inspire these 
positions below, starting with the guest workers in the 1970s and a discourse of 
cultural difference. Then I will discuss the welfare differences between Morocco and 
the Netherlands and the issue of marriages of convenience. Lastly I will address the 
still-popular new realism discourse, in which Islam is seen as the main problem. 
5.1. Guest workers and concerns about mixed marriages – the 1970s 
When Eva met Ayman, he had already been living and working in the Netherlands 
for some time. Moroccan migration to the Netherlands started with a demand for 
foreign workers in the 1950s and 1960s. Companies recruited personnel from 
Southern Europe in the 1950s and Morocco and Turkey in the 1960s. Migration 
streams consisted mainly of young men, some of whom married Dutch women. 
Initially, their presence was seen as temporary, using the term guest workers, and 
settlement in the Netherlands and family reunification was restricted (Bonjour 
2006, p. 4-5).  
According to Hondius (1999), cultural difference was the main focus with regard to 
mixed marriages in the 1970s. Moroccan migrants were generally seen as poor 
men, victims of their circumstances, and not as a threat. Mixed marriages were the 
target of social aid, focussing explicitly on teaching Dutch women how to deal with 
cultural differences. In her research, and in her story, Eva, who married in the 
1970s, focuses not so much on her husband being Moroccan or Muslim, but on their 
                                                 
23 Rabia’s divorce took place before the new Moroccan Moudawana of 2004 came into force. Before 
2004, the recognition of a foreign divorce was a complicated procedure.  
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marriage being mixed. Having seen other mixed marriages fail, Eva expected 
problems in the interaction of family law systems. She seemed to consider 
Moroccan family law not so much as threat or something to protect herself against. 
Instead, she aimed to reconcile their legal situation in both countries, aiming at a 
contract which would be acceptable in both legal systems. Eva and Ayman saw the 
fact that their marriage would be a mixed marriage as the main risk and that two 
different legal systems might not handle their marriage in the same way. Therefore 
they oriented themselves both towards the Moroccan and the Dutch system, and in 
particular their possible interactions. 
5.2. Differences in prosperity and marriages of convenience 
A recurring theme in the stories of Rabia and Inge concerns the differences in 
prosperity between the Netherlands and Morocco. In Morocco, the Netherlands was 
seen as a very wealthy country, and a husband working there was considered to be 
a good prospect financially. Thus, unlike Eva and Inge, Rabia did not seem to 
consider her transnational marriage a risk from which she should protect herself in 
a marriage contract. As she expected her husband to make good money in the 
Netherlands, she did not worry too much about the mahr in her marriage contract. 
Only when Rabia divorced did she first come into contact with Dutch family law, to 
which she had not given much thought until that moment. She was disappointed by 
this contact, as she considered the outcome to be unfair. Divorcing in the Dutch 
legal system, with its gender-neutral wordings of law, did not benefit her.  
For the Dutch or Dutch-Moroccan spouses in transnational marriages, marrying a 
foreign spouse will often mean providing someone from an economically less-
favourable environment with the means to migrate to the more wealthy 
Netherlands. If money becomes an issue, this seems to exclude the presence of 
“real” love. This notion of love as excluding all other motives for marriage has a 
strong presence in the Dutch context of transnational marriages. While both Rabia 
and Inge refer to their former husband not “really” loving them after all and having 
financial motives instead, an important difference between their stories is their 
access to Dutch residence. During the 1970s, a transition took place in Dutch 
migration policy. In changing economic circumstances restrictive measures were 
introduced to limit labour migration (Bonjour 2006, p. 6-8). Dutch policymakers 
started fearing marriages of convenience, by which they meant labour migration 
disguised as marriage migration. De Hart, for example, describes how Dutch civil 
servants, involved in executing immigration policies on marriages of convenience 
separate “real” marriages from marriages of convenience. A real marriage is solely 
based on love, without any other motives involved (de Hart 2003, p. 127-129). 
Eggebø (2013) and Fernández (2013) have also demonstrated the importance of 
such migration procedures in the stories of transnational couples, who relate their 
descriptions of love to the image of a marriage of convenience.  
Looking back on her marriage, Inge interprets several actions of Hicham as 
“evidence” that her marriage might not have been a “real marriage” for him, such 
as his withdrawal after the migration procedure failed and his request for money. 
This line of reasoning was used by several others in this research and can also be 
found on, for example, internet forums for Dutch living in Egypt. In this gendered 
narrative, Muslim husbands “should” pay for their wives’  expenses because of 
Islam, custom, or family law. Their failing to perform this male provider role is seen 
as a sign that they are not proper, loving, husbands but married for the sole 
purpose of financial or visa reasons. It is remarkable that, through such a gendered 
frame, even if Egyptian or Moroccan husbands are very poor compared to their 
Dutch wives, proof of “real love” is closely connected to the male provider role.  
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5.3. New realism discourse – Islam as a problem 
Since the 1990s, Muslims, and especially Moroccan migrants, occupy a particular 
position in politics and the Dutch media. Moroccan migrants and their children have 
often been at the centre of the public debate, focusing on issues of gender 
inequality and juvenile delinquency. In this discourse, Muslim women have taken 
centre stage as victims, while Muslim men are seen as perpetrators, both with a 
large distance from society: “[…] Dutch laws and customs particularly conflict with 
the privileges of immigrant (i.e. Muslim) men. Immigrant (i.e. Muslim) women, on 
the other hand, were depicted as ‘victims’ of their own culture, and as having a 
self-evident interest in their integration into Dutch society” (Prins and Saharso 
2008, p. 368). Similarly, Roggeband and Verloo have shown how, as a result of 
parallel shifts in gender equality policy and policy frames on the integration of 
ethnic minorities between 1995 and 2005, Muslim women were singled out as a 
“group in particular need of emancipation” (Roggeband and Verloo 2007, p. 286). 
As Prins and Saharso (2010, 2008) have described, with regard to migration and 
integration, a public discourse of “new realism” has emerged and has quickly 
become mainstream. In this highly gendered discourse, a backlash against 
multiculturalism, public policy, and social debates should depart from a no-
nonsense, frank discussion of the problems ordinary people have with Muslims 
living in the Netherlands, leaving behind “old taboos” like racism (Prins and Saharso 
2008, 2010, p. 74-77).  
Islamic family law occupies an important place in such current political debates, 
generally portraying Islamic family law as dangerous for women. Opponents 
generally use the Arabic term sharia, which has strong connotations of extremism 
and violence. Following requests from parliament for information, members of the 
Dutch government ordered research into issues related to Islam and the law. 
Research was undertaken on topics like sharia courts and alternative dispute 
resolution for Dutch Muslims (Bakker et al. 2010), forced marriages (Koning and 
Bartels 2005, Ratia and Walter 2009), informal Islamic marriages (Leun and Leupen 
2009) and polygamy (Boele-Woelki, Curry-Summer and Schrama 2009). The 
connection with debates on the integration of migrants is clear from the selection of 
the subjects of these research projects, issues which are far removed from the 
everyday life of most Dutch Muslims.24 In 2012, the controversial right-wing 
politician, Geert Wilders of the Freedom party (PVV), in a typical example of the 
new realism discourse , called for a ban on the application of sharia by Dutch courts 
through private international law because of gender inequality.25  
Thus, since the 1990s, mixed marriages between a native Dutch woman and a 
native Egyptian or Moroccan partner were mostly seen as problematic because of 
the husbands being Muslim. In the Netherlands, there is a strong othering of 
especially Muslim men as being problematic. Kamminga (1993) has done research 
on the representations of mixed relationships in the Dutch media. Dutch and 
foreign men and women are ascribed different positions and motives. Especially 
marriages of Dutch women and (foreign) Muslim men are seen as a problem. In 
these marriages representations of power relations between native and foreign and 
men and women collide (Kamminga 1993, p. 34-35). Hondius also notes that 
frightening stories and negative representations concerning mixed marriages in the 
Dutch media concern nearly exclusively Dutch women married to men from Muslim 
countries (Hondius 1999, p. 177). Many of the interviewed women in the present 
study reported that their friends and families were worried or disapproving of their 
choice of husband. 
                                                 
24 I would like to thank my colleague, Friso Kulk, for drawing my attention to these research projects as 
an illustration of the public debate on Islamic family law and its preoccupation with integration issues.  
25 PVV website, Uhttp://www.pvv.nl/index.php/component/content/article/36-geert-wilders/4316-
creeping-sharia.htmlU, accessed on 7 August 2012.  
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Considering this Dutch context, it is not remarkable that Inge, similar to other 
Dutch women in the research who got married in the 2000s, took care to gain 
knowledge of Moroccan family law. Inge focused exclusively on the risks of 
Moroccan family law, framing her marriage as an “Islamic marriage”. She uses her 
marriage contract to protect herself and her children from some of the perceived 
risks of Moroccan family law, mostly its gender inequalities. Inge made considerable 
effort to prepare herself for a marriage in Morocco, reading the Moroccan family 
law, searching information on the internet and contacting the Dutch embassy in 
Rabat. The popular negative perceptions of Islamic law as risky made Moroccan 
family law something to be aware of. This focus on Moroccan or Egyptian family law 
as problematic for women does not leave much room for critical consideration of 
Dutch family law. Through the othering of these foreign family law systems as 
being dangerous for women, Dutch family law is implicitly constructed as “safe”. It 
is ironic that the legal consequences Inge wanted to prevent might have happened 
anyway if Hicham would have migrated to the Netherlands, not because of 
Moroccan family law, but because of Dutch family law.  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I have discussed the possibilities for conditions upon marriage in 
transnational marriages and why and how spouses in transnational Dutch-Moroccan 
and Dutch-Egyptian marriages have made use of these possibilities. By retelling the 
stories of Eva, Inge and Rabia, I have demonstrated the importance of risk 
perceptions for how and why spouses handled the contractual aspects of their 
marriage. The social context in which these transnational marriages take place 
labels some of these marriages as “mixed” and others not, and labels some mixed 
marriages as potentially problematic while others are not. I argue that it is this 
framing of the marriage which informs how some spouses in transnational 
marriages consider the legal aspects of their transnational marriages. Moreover, the 
context of fear of marriages of convenience combined with a focus on love as an 
exclusive marriage motive also provided a frame for action with regard to the 
inclusion or absence of conditions in the marriage contract. 
In the Dutch context, time plays an important role in this process. As we have seen 
in this article, there is a shift in public debates from attention to cultural differences 
in general to a focus on the negative aspects of Islam and Islamic family law. When 
comparing the stories of Eva, married and divorced in the Netherlands in the 
19070s and Inge, married in Morocco and divorced in the Netherlands in the 2000s, 
this shift diverts attention from the problems of the interaction of both family law 
systems to just the perceived disadvantages for women in the Moroccan or 
Egyptian family law system, obscuring Dutch family law as a factor of importance. 
Even though both Dutch women saw their marriage as “risky” and took a very 
contractual approach to the marriage, the content of the contracts and why they 
wrote them depended on their framing of the marriage in a specific context.  
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